Realistic Expectations: Demographics and the Pursuit of Prosperity in Saskatchewan by Yvan Guillemette & William B.P. Robson
C.D. Howe Institute
Backgrounder
www.cdhowe.org No. 107, November 2007
Realistic Expectations:
Demographics and the Pursuit of
Prosperity in Saskatchewan 
Yvan Guillemette
William B.P. Robson 
The Backgrounder in Brief
Saskatchewan’s current economic good times belie serious demo-
graphic challenges that threaten the province’s ability to improve its
citizens living standards in the years ahead, or provide robust social
programs.
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askatchewan’s current economic performance is good. Incomes and
demand are growing strongly, and the province is gaining population from
the rest of the country for the first time in decades. This robust period
offers a timely opportunity for the province to enhance its economic and
fiscal position. Barring further progress on several fronts, time is working against
the province. Demographic forces will challenge Saskatchewan’s ability to
materially improve its citizens’ living standards in the decades ahead if it does not
further improve its attractiveness to people and investors, and enhance the
participation of its Aboriginal people in the provincial economy.
A Challenging Outlook
While population growth is as much a marker of economic success as a
precondition for it, a shrinking or stagnant population tends to mean a shrinking
or stagnant workforce and dimming economic prospects. For many years,
demographic developments have cast a shadow over Saskatchewan’s economic
outlook. While the province has experienced net gains in migration from other
provinces during two recent quarters, they are a mere fillip when set against wider
demographic patterns, including out-migration, fertility and life expectancy rates,
over recent decades. If these wider patterns prevail, they threaten the province’s
ability to offer rising living standards and robust public programs.
Demographic Background
What would a middle-of-the-road projection of Saskatchewan’s recent
demographic experience suggest about the province’s future? The C.D. Howe
Institute’s projections for the next five decades, like those of Statistics Canada
(Statistics Canada, 2005), highlight some key concerns.
Consider two scenarios: an “outmigration” scenario and a “no-outmigration”
scenario (the assumptions for each are summarized in Table 1). In both:
￿ Saskatchewan’s total fertility rate stays constant at 1.8 births per woman
for the non-Aboriginal population and 2.6 births per woman for the
Aboriginal population;
￿ Life expectancy at birth improves at a rate similar to Statistics Canada’s
medium assumption throughout the projection period;
￿ Net international migration for each age and sex category stays constant at
its 2001–2006 average and affects only the non-Aboriginal population.
For the outmigration scenario, net interprovincial migration per year, by age and
sex category, continues at its 2001–2006 average and affects both Aboriginals and
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* With compliments to Dale Eisler, author of False Expectations: Politics and the Pursuit of the
Saskatchewan Myth (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2006). We thank Tim Hearn, Jack
Mintz, Herb Pinder, Finn Poschmann, John Richards, and a number of other readers for helpful
comments and discussion. Responsibility for any remaining errors and for the conclusions is
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non-Aboriginals proportionally to their populations.
1 For the no-outmigration
scenario, we assume zero net inter-provincial migration over the projection period.
Although Saskatchewan recently recorded two consecutive quarters of positive net
inter-provincial migration, this is the first such occurrence since 1984, and
coincides with an exceptionally robust period of demand for natural resources
(Figure 1) — so we think no-outmigration a better basis for an alternative
projection. The difference between the two population paths — which is
particularly marked in the case of the population of traditional working age
(18–64) — shows the power of interprovincial migration to drive overall numbers
(Figure 2).
One key summary demographic measure — the population 65 and over
relative to the working-age population — rises in both scenarios (Figure 3). Since
younger people are likelier to leave the province, however, it rises markedly more
in the outmigration scenario.
1 To the extent that Aboriginals are less likely to move between provinces than are non-
Aboriginals, the assumption of proportional movements will understate the degree to which the
share of the population that is Aboriginal increases in the outmigration scenario.
Table 1:  Saskatchewan Population Projections — Assumptions and Results
1986 1996 2006 2016 2026 2036 2046
Assumptions (actual) (actual) (actual)



































Total Fertility Rate (birth per woman)
Non-Aboriginal 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Aboriginal 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6


















































Source:  Statistics Canada and authors’ calculationsC.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 3





























































Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Commodities are energy, food and industrial materials. Amplitude of scale for commodities is twice
that shown. Saskatchewan GDP is provincial GDP deflator relative to national GDP deflator.
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A second potentially important phenomenon under either scenario is an
increase in the share of the population of Aboriginal descent (Figure 4). While
Aboriginals account for slightly more than 14 percent of Saskatchewan’s
population today, current mortality and fertility patterns suggest they will account
for between 25 and 30 percent of the total population five decades from now. Their
share of the working-age population will rise faster, from 13 percent today to more
than 32 percent in the outmigration scenario and about 26 percent in the no-
outmigration scenario.
Economic Projections
Real GDP per person aged 18–64 in Saskatchewan grew at an average rate of 1.9
percent per year from 1994 to 2006. Thanks to both a pronounced rise in the share
of that age group in the total population and greater output per potential worker,
real output per person in the entire population grew 2.4 percent annually. Future
trends in real output and incomes per person are hard to anticipate with
confidence. Some analysts argue that future scarcity of labour will raise the
amount of capital, and therefore real output, per worker. Others argue that a
slower-growing and older population will depress saving, capital formation, and
productivity growth. We will have more to say on these possibilities below; for our
projections, we adopt the simple assumption that the 1994–2006 average rate of
growth in output per potential worker persists indefinitely.
Before projecting growth in the overall economy and output per person on the
assumption that all potential workers are identical, however, we should discuss
the potential implications of a rise in the share of the working-age population that
is Aboriginal. The 2001 census showed average employment income per
Aboriginal of working age at some $11,481 annually, compared to $24,251 for non-
Aboriginals of working age.
2 Absent more direct information on the relative
participation of the two population groups in Saskatchewan’s economy, we use
the ratio of these income figures as a proxy for the relative amounts of GDP
generated by an average working-age person from each.
Aging and the change in the demographic mix of the population have
awkward implications for the future growth of living standards of the average
Saskatchewan resident (Table 2). In all cases, output per person rises more slowly
than the 2.4 percent figure recorded from 1994 to 2006 — a consequence of the
declining share of the population that is of working age.
In the version of the outmigration scenario which assumes all working-age
people to be identical in terms of average output, growth falls by a percentage
point. In the version of the outmigration projections which assume an unchanged
ratio of output per person between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal working-
age populations, output per person grows more slowly yet: at only half its
historical rate. The no-outmigration scenario is somewhat better: the version that
does not distinguish between the two populations shows growth at 1.6 percent
2 Statistics Canada, 2001 Census Individual Microfile.annually, and the projection assuming an unchanged ratio of output per person for
the two populations shows growth of 1.5 percent.
3
Fiscal Projections
What about the interaction of population changes with public programs? The
population figures just described allow a projection of some demographically
sensitive programs.
￿ In the case of healthcare, we project expenditures for six age groups for
each sex. The amount of healthcare goods and services devoted to a person
of a given age and sex is (conservatively) assumed to keep pace with
productivity growth in the broader economy. In other words, increases in
service intensity per recipient match increases in output per potential
worker. And health-sector inflation is assumed to rise at the same pace as
government-consumption inflation generally since 1994: 2.6 percent (which
is marginally above the general inflation rate of 2 percent successfully
targeted by the Bank of Canada during that period).
￿ For education, we project spending on elementary school students from the
population aged 4 to 17 years and spending on postsecondary students
from the population aged 18 to 24. We assume, as with health, that the
intensity of education services per student rises with productivity, and that
inflation in education outpaces general inflation by the same margin — 0.6
percentage points — assumed in the case of healthcare.
￿ For completeness, we also model Saskatchewan’s programs targeted to the
elderly. Our projections for the Saskatchewan Income Plan for seniors
6 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
3 We note that the 1.9 percent increase in output per average working-age person in Saskatchewan
recorded from 1994 to 2006 must reflect, among other things, changes in the share of the
working-age population that is Aboriginal and changes in the relative contributions of
Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals to provincial GDP. Differences in the questions about ethnic
identity in successive censuses make it difficult to quantify these changes, however, and therefore
we cannot say whether their net effect was to boost or retard Saskatchewan’s growth.
Notes:
a Based on total population.
b Convergence refers to closing the gap between the average output per person of working-age, 
non-Aboriginals and Aboriginals.







No-outmigration, no convergence 1.5
Outmigration, convergence 1.5
No-outmigration, convergence 1.8
Table 2:  Annual Average Growth of Real GDP per capita in Saskatchewan
a
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assume that the trajectory of real benefits per person aged 65 and up will
evolve in line with federal Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income
Supplement and Allowance payments per person aged 65 and up, as
derived from projections by Canada’s Chief Actuary (OCA 2005). Further,
we assume that those benefits are indexed to inflation. The program is too
small, however, to materially affect the overall calculations.
We know no information that would allow us to quantify the impact on public
spending of changing shares of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations.
The differing projections just outlined do, however, let us compare spending
under both the outmigration and no-outmigration scenarios to provincial incomes
(Figure 5). All the scenarios show some breathing space for the province over the
next decade. Dwindling numbers of young people should permit savings in the
education budget, and the pronounced upward pressure of aging on healthcare
spending takes some time to emerge. After that, however, the upward pressure of
aging on healthcare dominates, so that the share of Saskatchewan GDP required
for demographically sensitive programs escalates from its current level of around
13 percent. It rises a little above 15 percent in the version of the no-outmigration
scenario that assumes all potential workers are identical, and to more than 20
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percent in the version of the outmigration scenario that assumes continued
differences in the capacity of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations to
generate output and income.
Recent Performance
To meet these challenges, Saskatchewan needs to deploy its people effectively,
equip them with the physical capital they need to succeed, create a competitive tax
environment, and contain the cost of government.
Deployment of the Workforce
Many of Saskatchewan’s labour-market indicators — the participation rate,
employment rate, and unemployment rate — have tended to be better than their
national counterparts for years, and the dispersion of unemployment rates across
economic regions in Saskatchewan is also below the Canadian average
(Guillemette 2006). These are all signs of a healthy labour market. However, as the
stylized projections of economic growth using the ratio of average employment
incomes of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations just showed, a critical
task for the future will be fostering fuller participation by Saskatchewan’s
Aboriginal population in the market economy. A full exploration of the steps that
would promote this result is beyond the scope of this paper, and would be highly
politically charged. These include raising the educational attainment of Aboriginal
students, fostering the development of enterprise on reserves, and changing the
fiscal incentives that discourage Aboriginals from moving to better opportunities.
That a debate on these issues is worthwhile, however, is evident from the potential
payoff.
Suppose that over the next 50 years improved opportunities for Aboriginals
eliminated the gap between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal participation in the
market economy that we assume in our projections. Specifically, suppose that
more rapid growth in Aboriginal participation caused the amount of GDP
generated by an average working-age Aboriginal person to converge with that
generated by a comparable non-Aboriginal by the end of the period. Not only
would the boost to living standards of the Aboriginal population be immense, but
there would be a material impact on average living standards for all Saskatchewan
residents. Figure 6 contrasts this more buoyant outlook with the alternative where
the relative output of the two populations does not change, under both the
outmigration and no-outmigration scenarios. Convergence would raise the
economic growth rate under the outmigration scenario to match the growth rate
under the no-outmigration scenario without convergence — in other words, it
would offset the impact of outmigration on the living standards of the average
person in Saskatchewan. And convergence under the no-outmigration scenario
would boost growth in output per person to 1.8 percent — a far more robust
economic base.
This more buoyant economic base would, in turn, improve the outlook for the
financing of demographically sensitive programs. As Figure 7 illustrates, the shareC.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 9
Figure 7:  Demographically Sensitive Programs Under Various Scenarios (including 








1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055
Outmigration Scenario, no convergence Outmigration Scenario, convergence



























Source: Authors’ projections as described in the text.

















































Source: Authors’ projections as described in the text.
Actual  Forecast10 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
of provincial incomes claimed by these programs at the end of 50 years under the
outmigration scenario falls by some 3 percentage points if convergence between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal incomes raises income growth over the
intervening years. And in the no-outmigration scenario, convergence between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal incomes would contain the claim of
demographically driven programs on Saskatchewan GDP so effectively that it
would not exceed its level in the late 1980s even at the end of the period.
To repeat, policies that promote convergence of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
participation in the provincial economy through more rapid growth in Aboriginal
incomes can markedly brighten Saskatchewan’s outlook. At present, the
employment rates of Aboriginals in Saskatchewan tend to be low — data from the
2001 census showed the off-reserve Aboriginal employment rate to be the lowest
of any province except Newfoundland and Labrador, while the on-reserve
employment rate, at 29 percent, was the lowest in any province (Luffman and
Sussman 2007). These unsettling facts are, perversely, cause for hope: merely
raising the employment rates of Aboriginals in Saskatchewan to those already
evident elsewhere would be a large first step.
Improving Saskatchewan’s Outlook: 
Some Promising Options
If a full exploration of the policies that could promote convergence between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal incomes is beyond the scope of this paper, some
other suggestions for improving the outlook for people in Saskatchewan of all
backgrounds are easier to make with confidence. We therefore close with a survey
of some of the most promising ones.
Equipping Workers
Capital investment — equipping workers with better tools — is a key factor in
maintaining and improving standards of living. While Saskatchewan has been
doing relatively well by Canadian standards, Canadian businesses as a whole lag
their US counterparts in equipping workers. For every $1 of new investment in
plant and equipment per US worker this year, the average Canadian worker will
benefit from about 82 cents of new capital, while each Saskatchewanian worker
will benefit from a little less than 88 cents.
4 Troublingly, Saskatchewan’s
investment edge relative to the already unimpressive performance of the rest of
the country has been eroding (Figure 8). Since about 27 percent of the province’s
business-sector, non-residential capital spending is in oil and gas, and another 13
percent is in mining — both sectors where demand and prices have been cyclically
high — the relative deterioration of Saskatchewan’s investment performance
during a period of strong natural resource prices is disappointing.
4 See Banerjee and Robson (2007) for details on the sample and results; see Robson and Goldfarb
(2004) for details on the methodology. Business-sector capital spending includes government
enterprises operating in a commercial environment.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 11
A natural place to start in seeking improvement is Saskatchewan’s business tax
environment. Saskatchewan has made progress in recent years on this score. It has
reduced its statutory corporate income tax rate from 17 percent a few years ago to
13 percent, and a further one-point cut will take effect in 2008. The province is also
eliminating its general capital tax and raising its small business income threshold
to $500,000 by the same year. While these changes should improve Saskatchewan’s
relative position — and Saskatchewan’s investment performance has indeed been
good by Canadian standards — other jurisdictions are not standing still. Notably,
even after these changes, Saskatchewan’s regime will still not be competitive with
Alberta, which has a general corporate income tax rate of 10 percent (Table 3) and
no sales taxes on capital inputs.
This latter point highlights one of the best tax-reform initiatives Saskatchewan
could undertake: making the provincial sales tax more like a value-added tax —
possibly by harmonizing it with the federal GST.
5 Eliminating sales taxes on
business inputs would move Saskatchewan out of the group of five provinces with
such taxes,
6 and in which the overall tax burden on the incremental dollar of
business investment tends to be higher (Table 3).
We note, finally, that Saskatchewan has the highest number of small businesses
per 100 population of any province in Canada (Chambers and Church 2006, 10).
7
5 This issue has been extensively studied recently in Saskatchewan; see for example the
Saskatchewan Business Tax Review Committee Report (Saskatchewan 2005).
6 The others are British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and PEI.
7 Small businesses include businesses with fewer than 50 employees as well as workers who are
self-employed, unincorporated and without paid help.
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While neither positive nor negative in itself, this fact raises the question of
whether taxes and other elements of Saskatchewan’s business environment —
regulations that take effect when firms reach a given size of capital or employment
— encourage businesses to stay small. Tax and regulatory changes that made
investment and expansion more attractive might prompt more of Saskatchewan’s
plentiful small enterprises to grow into bigger ones.
Shaping a Good Tax Environment for Individuals
The personal tax environment in Saskatchewan is also important, both to retaining
taxpayers in the province, and to encouraging people in the province to work and
to save.
We know from inter-provincial migration data that most people who leave
Saskatchewan head for next-door Alberta, and a smaller proportion moves to
British Columbia. Comparing the personal income tax system of Saskatchewan to
that of these two provinces shows Saskatchewan at a disadvantage in some
respects (Figure 9). For taxpayers with taxable income below $80,000, both Alberta
and British Columbia offer a lower marginal tax rate than Saskatchewan.
Especially for people with taxable income below $40,000, BC offers a significant
advantage. For people with more than $80,000 of taxable income, Saskatchewan
and BC have roughly comparable marginal tax rates, but Alberta’s are significantly
lower.
8
Sales Tax Statutory Corporate Income Tax
Federal-Provincial Marginal Effective 
Tax Rate (METR) on Capital, 2007
General Small
percent
Newfoundland & Labrador 8.0 14.0 5.0 11.4
Prince Edward Island 10.0 16.0 4.3 30.6
Nova Scotia 8.0 16.0 5.0 17.5
New Brunswick 8.0 13.0 5.0 6.6
Québec 7.5 9.9 8.0 25.2
Ontario 8.0 14.0 5.5 37.0
Manitoba 7.0 14.0 3.0 32.5
Saskatchewan 5.0 13.0 4.5 30.2
Alberta 0.0 10.0 3.0 23.0
British Columbia 7.0 12.0 4.5 31.6
National Average 6.9 13.2 4.8 30.9
Table 3:  Summary Comparison — Provincial Tax Rates, 2007
Source: PEI (2007); Chen, Mintz and Tarasov (2007).
Note: The marginal effective tax rate on capital is the share of the pre-tax return on capital necessary to cover business
taxes, leaving a residual to cover the cost of debt and equity used to finance capital investments. It takes into
account corporate income taxes, capital taxes, sales taxes on business inputs and other capital-related taxes.
8 If these effective tax rate calculations were amended to include the employer-paid portion of
provincial payroll taxes, Saskatchewan would fare a little better in comparison, because the
province does not levy a payroll tax for health.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 13
Furthermore, taxes and clawbacks of transfers subject modest-income
taxpayers to high marginal effective tax rates (METRs). By taking into account tax
rates and clawbacks on government transfers and supplements as income rises,
METRs are an excellent measure of the extra tax burden faced by the poor on
every extra dollar they earn. The situation varies by family size and income
structure — one way of getting a rough overview is to average the METR for all
families at a given earned-income level (Figure 10). The relatively high METRs for
families who have not yet achieved middle-class status likely discourage work
and saving by such lower-income families. This is a concern in its own right, and
especially so given the fact that these high effective rates will particularly affect
Aboriginals, impeding the convergence of incomes that would improve
Saskatchewan’s prospects. Several features of Saskatchewan’s personal tax and
transfer system — notably its employment supplement for low-income working
families — give it a less punitive system than most other Canadian provinces, so
improving this situation would enhance an area where the province already
stands out for good practice. Reducing marginal tax rates for seniors would also
improve the environment for work among those near or past age 65 — another
potential source of extra work effort the province would be wise to encourage.
Containing the Cost of Government
A critical task in achieving more competitive and growth-friendly tax rates is
containing the cost of government. Here too, Saskatchewan has set some good
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precedents. Its money-purchase, provincial-employee pensions are unique in the
country, and it responded to the fiscal pressures of the 1990s earlier and more
completely than many other jurisdictions, reducing its net debt level by
approximately $1 billion from fiscal 1995/96 to 2005/06. Combined with lower
interest rates, this progress let the province cut its debt servicing costs as a share of
revenue by more than half over that decade.
Saskatchewan also responded to fiscal pressures in the early 1990s by cutting
program spending. On this front, however, its relatively favourable position
relative to other Canadian provinces has eroded since then (Table 4). Provincial
spending grew at an average rate of 5.0 percent over the decade to 2005/07 —
more than three times as rapidly as was promised in each year’s budget.
9 Over the
past two years alone, the legislature voted a cumulative 1.2 percentage points of
increased spending, but actual spending grew by a cumulative 16.3 percentage
points. Such unbudgeted largesse undermines Saskatchewan’s ability to give itself
a competitive business and personal tax environment, and jeopardizes its ability to
pay for future demographically driven rises in program spending.
9 Only Alberta’s overruns were worse during this period (Adrian, Guillemette and Robson 2007).
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Imperatives for the Future
Absent higher growth of output per working-age person or rising labour-force
participation among the older population, the relative decline in the share of
Saskatchewan’s population that is working age is bound to dampen growth of
output per person in the decades ahead. This prospect worsens notably if a rising
Aboriginal share of the working-age population coincides with a failure to narrow
the gap between the tendencies of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations
to participate in the provincial economy. One key implication of these scenarios is
that demographically sensitive public programs will become much more difficult
to finance.
Two key routes to improving the outlook are (i) ending the outmigration that
has affected the province for most of the past quarter-century, and (ii) fostering
fuller participation in the provincial economy on the part of the Aboriginal
population. These are not small, easily achievable tasks, and in the interim, key
policy initiatives are required. Improving the fiscal climate for businesses and
individuals — and containing the growth of government spending that will
impede progress on those fronts — would be a good way for Saskatchewan to
capitalize on recent economic buoyancy and put itself on a stronger footing to
confront the challenges of the future.
Table 4:  Provincial Government Expenditures as a Share of GDP: 1995, 2000 and 2005
Note:   Expenditures are on a fiscal year basis, so, for example, 2005 expenditures are for fiscal year 2005/06 ended 
March 31, 2006.





Newfoundland & Labrador 35.2 29.8 23.3 -11.9
Prince Edward Island 31.3 30.9 29.1 -2.2
Nova Scotia 26.9 23.8 23.6 -3.3
New Brunswick 29.6 26.4 26.5 -3.1
Québec 27.1 24.9 25.5 -1.6
Ontario 18.9 15.8 16.6 -2.4
Manitoba 25.6 24.7 23.8 -1.9
Saskatchewan 23.0 20.3 21.0 -2.1
Alberta 16.4 14.3 13.1 -3.3
British Columbia 22.5 21.3 19.5 -3.0
Canadian Average 22.1 19.4 19.1 -2.9References
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